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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ADOPTS DRAFT 
ARTICLES ON TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS 
By Stephen C. McCaffrey* 
At its 2008 session the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) completed 
work on a set of nineteen draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers and trans-
mitted the draft to the General Assembly. 1 The ILC recommended that the Assembly take 
note of the draft articles and at a later stage consider the elaboration of a convention based 
upon them.2 
The Commission's work on transboundary groundwater was originally intended to com-
plement its earlier draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international water-
courses,3 which formed the basis for the negotiation of the 1997 UN convention on the sub-
ject.4 Scientifically, the transboundary aquifers draft accurately and most usefully reflects the 
hydrology of aquifers, thanks to the assistance given the ILC by the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other UN scientific bodies. 
Legally, however, the draft is less than a perfect fit with the UN Convention and introduces 
a novel, and potentially regressive, concept into the law in this field. Mter reviewing the back-
ground of the trans boundary aquifers draft, this Note sets forth a general overview of its pro-
visions and offers comments on the general approach of the draft and its relationship with the 
UN Convention. 
I. BACKGROUND 
When it adopted the final version of its draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses in 1994,5 the ILC also adopted a resolution on confined trans-
boundary groundwater.6 The resolution reads in part as follows: 
*University of rhe Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1 Reporr of the International Law Commission on the Work ofits Sixtieth Session, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, at 19, UN Doc. N63/10 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 ILC Reporr]. The Commission's documents cited in 
this Note are available on rhe ILC Web sire, < http://www.un.org/law/ilc/> , unless otherwise noted. 
2 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 18. 
3 Rep orr of the I nrernational Law Commission on the Work of Irs Forty-sixth Session, [ 1994] 2 Y. B. Inr'l L. 
Comm'n, pt. 2, at 89, UN Doc. N491 10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Report]; see Stephen C. McCaffrey, The 
International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on International Watercourses, 89 AJIL 395 (1995). 
4 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses oflnternational Watercourses, May 21, 1997,36 ILM 
700 (1997) [hereinafter UN Convention]. 
5 1994 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 89. 
6 Resolution on Confined Transboundaty Groundwater, id. at 135. 
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The International Law Commission, 
Having completed its consideration of the topic "The law of the non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses", 
Having comidered in that context groundwater which is related to an international 
watercourse, 
Recognizing that confined groundwater, that is groundwater not related to an interna-
tional watercourse, is also a natural resource of vital importance for sustaining life, health 
and the integrity of ecosystems, 
Recognizing also the need for continuing efforts to elaborate rules pertaining to confined 
transboundary groundwater, 
1. Commends States to be guided by the principles contained in the draft articles on the 
law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, where appropriate, in reg-
ulating transboundary groundwater. 7 
The resolution thus recognized (in terms that were not altogether precise) that the draft arti-
cles on international watercourses cover "groundwater which is related to an international 
watercourse."8 This acknowledgment is important both legally and factually, since "[n] early 
all surface-water features (streams, lakes, reservoirs, wetlands, and estuaries) inceract with 
ground water."9 While in this respect the resolution was redundant, as the draft arricles (and 
the UN Convencion) define "watercourse" to include both surface water and hydrologically 
related groundwater, 10 the poinc was dear enough: the draft articles on international water-
courses covered internationally shared surface water and related groundwater, but not ground-
water that was unrelated to this "system" 11 of surface and underground water-i.e., not " con-
fined transboundary groundwater. " 12 Considering that an indication of its view as to the law 
governing this form of groundwater would be useful, the Commission, in the resolution's first 
operative paragraph, commended the principles in the international watercourses draft to 
states for guidance on the regulation of transboundary groundwater. 13 It could therefore be 
argued that no further action by the ILC was required on transboundary groundwater, since 
the Commission dealt with the part related to surface water in its international watercourses 
articles, and recommended that the principles contained in the latter articles be applied to con-
fined transboundary aquifers. However, as seen, the ILC did recognize, in the resolution's pre-
amble, "the need for continuing efforts to elaborate rules pertaining to confined transboundary 
groundwater." 14 
7 !d. 
8 !d., pmbl. 
9 Foreword co THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., GROUND WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE REsOURCE 
at III (U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1139, 1998), available at < hnp://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ 11 39/>. 
10 The draft articles, like the UN Convention, define "watercourse" to mean "a system of surface waters and 
ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a com-
mon terminus." Art. 2(b), 1994 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 90. "International watercourse" is defined simply as 
"a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different Scates." Art. 2(a), id. 
11 T his term is used in the definition of "watercourse." See supra note I 0. 
12 See Commentary on Art. 2(b), 1994 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 90. The commentary notes: "Some members 
of the Commission ... believed chat [confined] groundwater should be included within the term 'watercourse', 
provided that the aquifer in which iris contained is intersected by a boundary." 
13 Resolution on Confined T ransboundary Groundwater, supra note 6, para. l . 
14 !d., pmbl. 
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In 2002 the ILC included the topic of shared natural resources in its program of work. The 
topic was understood to include groundwater, oil and natural gas, and perhaps other resources 
such as migratory birds and animals. 15 The ILC appointed Chusei Yamada as special rappor-
teur for the topic. He" considered that it would be appropriate to begin with the consideration 
of ground waters as the follow-up of the Commission's previous work on the codification of the 
law of surface waters." 16 The reference to the previous work on surface waters is not altogether 
accurate since, as noted above, the ILC' s previous work in the field dealt not only with surface 
water, but also with much of the world's groundwater: that which is hydrologically related to 
surface water. This point will be revisited below. The special rapporteur also stated that "the 
work on transboundary groundwaters could affect any future codification work by the Com-
mission on oil and natural gas" and that "the Commission might also wish to take into account 
some relevant elements of the existing regulations and State practice on oil and natural gas 
before finalizing its work on transboundary groundwaters." 17 (According to the ILC's com-
mentary on the draft articles, "the overwhelming majority [of government comments on the 
draft] supported the view that the law on transboundary aquifers should be treated indepen-
dently of any future work of the Commission on the issues related to oil and natural gas." 18) 
The special rapporteur thus posited a close relationship between the legal regimes governing 
transboundary groundwater, on the one hand, and oil and natural gas, on the other. He made 
no distinction between the commonly occurring groundwater that is hydrologically connected 
with surface water and groundwater, such as so-called fossil water, that is not so connected. As 
described in the following section, the ILC's transboundary aquifers draft addresses both 
forms. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES 
The ILC's draft on the law of transboundary aquifers consists of nineteen articles arranged 
in four parts: Introduction; General Principles; Protection, Preservation and Management; 
and Miscellaneous Provisions. 19 The first of the two articles in part 1, Article 1, defines the 
scope of the draft as including "(a) Utilization of transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems; 
(b) Other activities that have or are likely to have an impact upon such aquifers or aquifer sys-
tems; and (c) Measures for the protection, preservation and management of such aquifers or 
aquifer systems."20 This broad definition takes into account, in paragraphs (b) and (c), that 
15 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-fourth Session, paras. 518-19, UN 
GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 243-44, UN Doc. A/57110 (2002). 
'
6 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work oflts Fifty-eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 193, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006) (referring to the UN Convention, supra note 4) [hereinafter 2006 
ILC Report]. The Commission's previous work, of course, is that reflected in 1994 ILC Report, mpra note 3. 
17 2006 ILC Report, supra note 16, at 193. The special rapporteur dealt with the relationship between the work 
on groundwaters and that on oil and gas in his fourth report, considered at the ILC's 2007 session. See Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work oflts Fifty-ninth Session, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
at 124, UN Doc. N62/ 10 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ILC Report]; see id. at 126 (summarizing the Commission's 
discussion of the fourth report]. 
18 General commentary on the draft articles, para. 2, 2008 ILC Report, supra note l , at 28. 
19 These are the same tides as those used for parts I, II, IV, and VI, respectively, of the UN Convention, supra 
note 4. 
20 2008 ILC Report, supra note l, at 20. 
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activities other than the use of groundwater per se-for example, disposal of waste on the sur-
face ofland in a recharge zone-may adversely affect shared groundwater. Article 2 contains 
all-important definitions of the terms used throughout the draft. These include (by relevant 
paragraph of Article 2) "aquifer" (a), "aquifer system" (b), "transboundary aquifer" or " trans-
boundary aquifer system" (c), "aquifer State" (d), "utilization of transboundary aquifers or 
aquifer systems" (e), "recharging aquifer" (f), "recharge zone" (g), and "discharge zone" (h).2 1 
(Note that there is no definition of"groundwater.") 
The first of the seven articles of part 2, Article 3, Sovereignty of Aquifer States, proclaims 
the sovereignty of each aquifer state over the part of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system 
located in its territory. 22 This remarkable provision will be discussed further in the following 
section. It finds no counterpart in either the ILC's 1994 draft articles or the UN Convention. 
Articles 4 through 8 correspond to Articles 5 through 9 of the UN Convention. In general, 
these articles are modeled upon the corresponding provisions of the UN Convention, with 
appropriate adaptations. Article 4, however, simply refers to "the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization" rather than adjusting the text of Article 5(1) of the Convention setting 
forth that principle. The draft article then proceeds to state how this principle applies to trans-
boundary aquifers. 23 
Article 5 contains a nonexhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in ensuring that 
utilization of a transboundary aquifer is equitable and reasonable. The list generally tracks the 
one in Article 6 of the UN Convention (though the factors are reordered), again with appro-
priate modifications, but adds two factors:" (d) The contribution to the formation and recharge 
of the aquifer or aquifer system" and "(i) The role of the aquifer or aquifer system in the related 
ecosystem." According to the Commission's commentary, subparagraph (d) refers to "the 
comparative size of the aquifer in each aquifer State and the comparative importance of the 
recharge process in each State where the recharge zone is located."24 Subparagraph (d) thus goes 
beyond the UN Convention, which does not explicitly include the contribution of water by 
a given state as an indicative factor- although it may of course be relevant in a specific case and 
would thus be properly considered. Subparagraph (i) recognizes the importance of aquifers to 
sustaining the ecosystems related to them. The commentary describes the complex physical 
relationships characteristic of this function. 25 Paragraph 2 of Article 5, concerning the weight 
to be given to the various factors, reproduces Article 6(2) of the UN Convention, with appro-
priate adjustments. But it also adds the concept of "vital human needs," which is contained in 
Article 10 of the Convention, Relationship Between Different Kinds of Uses (a provision that 
does not have a counterpart in the transboundary aquifers draft): "in weighing different kinds 
of utilization of a trans boundary aquifer or aquifer system, special regard shall be given to vital 
2 1 !d. at 20- 21. 
22 !d. at 21. 
23 Interestingly, the Commission's commentary on Article 4 distinguishes berween "equitable" and "reason-
able" utilization of aquifers, explaining that three of the article's four paragraphs (relating to maximizing long-
term benefits, para. (b); establishing comprehensive utilization plans, para. (c); and nor overutilizing recharging 
rransboundary aquifers, para. (d)) are "more related to reasonable utilization." Commentary on Art. 4, para. 4, 
id. at 42. 
24 Commentary on Art. 5, para. 4, id. at 45. 
25 The commentary on paragraph (i) stares that the expression "related ecosystem" should be understood in the 
context of the use of the term "ecosystem" in d raft Article 10 on protection and preservation of ecosystems. !d. 
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human needs. "26 The intrinsic importance of this principle is magnified by its coming the clos-
est in both instruments to recognizing the human right to water.27 
Article 6, Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm, is the counterpart of the article that 
caused the most difficulry in negotiating the UN Convention, Article 7. Yet the aquifers draft, 
rather than simply reproducing it with only the most necessary adaptations, adds a paragraph 
and rewords the Convention's critical paragraph 2. The additional paragraph arguably is nec-
essary; since it deals with "activities other than utilization of a transboundary aquifer ... that 
have, or are likely to have, an impact upon that transboundary aquifer, "28 it will help to prevent 
an unduly narrow reading of the obligation to prevent the causing of significant harm. Article 
6 further reflects hydrologic realiry in requiring that significant harm be prevented, not only 
with respect to other states sharing a trans boundary aquifer, but also with respect to those "in 
whose territory a discharge zone is located. "29 Whether this rewording of the rather awkwardly 
formulated Article 7(2) of the UN Convention will be judged an acceptable balancing of the 
no-harm and equitable utilization obligations remains to be seen. The Commission omitted 
even the weak reference to compensation in Article 7(2),30 explaining that it is covered "by 
other rules of internationallaw."31 
Article 7, on the general obligation to cooperate, generally follows Article 8 of the UN Con-
vention but substitutes a terse provision for the somewhat long second paragraph on the estab-
lishment ofjoint management mechanisms that was added to Article 8 of the ILC' s draft during 
the negotiation of the UN Convention. According to this paragraph of the aquifers draft, states 
sharing aquifers ("aquifer states"32 ) "should" establish such mechanisms.33 
Article 8, concerning the regular exchange of data and information, in large part tracks the 
corresponding provision of the UN Convention, Article 9. The Commission, however, added 
what is probably an essential paragraph calling upon states sharing aquifers to develop further 
data and information on those aquifers when necessary.34 Another change, which is less felic-
itous, moved the words "where appropriate" in the final paragraph of the article, so that it reads: 
"Aquifer States shall, where appropriate, employ their best efforts to collect and process data 
and information in a manner that facilitates their utilization by the other aquifer States to 
which such data and information are communicated."35 The UN Convention's version placed 
the words "where appropriate" before "process," giving them a more limited effect. Inserting 
them before all words of obligation in the paragraph considerably broadens their scope and 
26 !d. at 22. 
27 See generally STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE lAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 369 - 7 I (2d ed. 
2007). 
28 Art. 6(2), 2008 ILC Report, supra note I, at 22. 
29 Art. 6(3), id. 
30 The states causing the harm are, "where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation." UN Conven-
tion, mpra note 4, Art. 7(2). 
3
' Commentary on Art. 6, para. 5, 2008 ILC Report, mpra note l, at 47. 
32 Article 2(d) defines "aquifer State" to mean "a State in whose territory any part of a transboundary aquifer or 
aquifer system is situated." !d. at 20. 
33 
"For the purpose of paragraph I , aquifer States should establish joint mechanisms of cooperation." Art. 7(2), 
id. at 23. 
34 Art. 8(2), id. 
3s Art. 8(4), id. The UN Convention's coumerpan provision reads: "Watercourse States shall employ their best 
efforts to collect and, where appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which facilitates its utilization 
by the other watercourse States to which it is communicated." UN Convention, mpra note 4, Art. 9(3). 
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weakens the article. Data and information collected by means of one system may not be usable 
by a state that employs another system. Yet the sharing of data and information is critical to 
the proper management of international watercourses, and to equitable utilization itself. Such 
sharing is particularly critical for groundwater, about which we have less knowledge than we 
do about surface water. 
Article 9, Bilateral and Regional Agreements and Arrangements, at first appears to be a new 
provision. Closer examination, however, reveals that it largely reproduces, with appropriate 
modifications, the fourth paragraph of Article 3 of the UN Convention, Watercourse Agree-
ments. The opening phrase of Article 9, however, gives rise to some confusion about the arti-
cle's relationship with Articles 7 and 14 of the draft. That phrase states: "For the purpose of 
managing a particular transboundary aquifer or aquifer system .... "36 Article 7, it will be 
recalled, encourages states to "establish joint mechanisms of cooperation." The Commission's 
commentary makes clear that these mechanisms are envisioned as engaging in various forms 
of coordination and management. 37 Article 14, Management, also deals with joint manage-
ment mechanisms. Why the ILC decided to deal with joint management mechanisms in three 
different articles, rather than grouping the relevant provisions in a single article, remains uncer-
tain. 38 In addition, it might be asked whether a provision on bilateral and regional agreements 
and arrangements even belongs in a section of the draft on general principles. 
Part 3 contains six articles, the first of which, Article 10, Protection and Preservation of 
Ecosystems, is based on Article 20 of the UN Convention. At first blush, it appears to weaken 
the latter provision somewhat by qualifying the obligation to protect transboundary aquifer-
related ecosystems with the words "take all appropriate measures."39 These words generally 
connote an obligation of due diligence, or making best efforts under the circumstances. While 
the obligation to "protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses" under 
Article 20 of the UN Convention is presumably one of due diligence even without these words, 
this interpretation is not entirely evident.40 The Commission's commentary indicates that the 
"obligation of States to take 'all appropriate measures' is limited to the protection of relevant 
ecosystems. This allows States greater flexibility in the implementation of their responsibilities 
under this provision."41 This explanation may raise more questions than it answers. Does it 
suggest that the words "take all appropriate measures" do not apply to the obligation to "pre-
serve" aquifer-related ecosystems? This reading seems unlikely, yet that is what the commen-
tary says on its face. Moreover, the explanation almost invites states to circumvent the basic 
obligation. 
Article 11, concerning recharge and discharge zones, is new. These zones are areas of the land 
surface through which an aquifer is recharged, or replenished, or where water from an aquifer 
36 Art. 9 , 2008 ILC Report, supra note I , at 23. 
37 Commentary on Arc. 7, id. at 49 - 50. 
38 One of the articles, Article 14, is located in a different part of the draft, part 3, from the other two, which are 
contained in part 2. 
39 Art. 10, 2008 ILC Report, supra note I, at 24. 
40 While the "Statements of Understanding" adopted by the Working Group of the Whole of the Sixth Com-
mince, in which the UN Convention was negotiated, scare char Articles 21- 23 of che Convention "impose a due 
diligence standard on watercourse States," they do nor include Article 20 in chis group. Report of the Sixth Com-
mince Convening as che Working Group of the Whole at Its Second Session, para. 8, UN Doc. N511869, at 5 
(Apr. II, I 997), reprinted in 36 ILM 720 (1997). 
41 Commentary on Art. 10, para. 4, 2008 ILC Report, supra note l, at 55. 
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emerges from the ground into a watercourse of some kind (such as a stream or a lake) or into 
the sea. It is therefore crucial that they-recharge zones in particular- be protected to avoid 
the contamination of aquifers. Article II provides for the identification of such zones and for 
their protection from harmful impacts. Importantly, it further recognizes that either of these 
kinds of zones may be located in a state other than the one(s) where the aquifer is located, that 
is, the aquifer state(s). Article I1 requires such nonaquifer states to cooperate with aquifer states 
to protect the aquifer and related ecosystems. 42 Yet whether nonaquifer states would be parties 
to any instrument based on the draft articles is uncertain. 
Article I2, Prevention, Reduction and Control ofPollution, is based on paragraph 2 of Arti-
cle 21 of the UN Convention. It is even more urgent to prevent the pollution of groundwater 
than that of surface water because once an aquifer is contaminated, it is ordinarily time-con-
suming and difficult, if not impossible, to restore its waters to their former unpolluted state. 
One would therefore have expected a detailed and robust provision on this subject. But in con-
trast to Article 2I of the Convention, which contains three rather lengthy and detailed para-
graphs in this regard, Article 12 consists of a solitary paragraph of two sentences. Further, 
unlike Article 2I of the Convention, Article I2 surprisingly contains no definition of"pollu-
tion"; nor is that term defined anywhere else in the draft articles. One would think, for example, 
that it should be made clear that saltwater intrusion into an aquifer (such as by overabstraction 
of water from it) is a form of "pollution" for the purpose of this provision. Article 12 does 
require that states sharing transboundary aquifers "take a precautionary approach in view of 
uncertainty about the nature and extent of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and of 
its vulnerability to pollution."43 On the surface, this provision appears to be a positive, logical, 
and even necessary feature, precisely in view of the "vulnerability" of aquifers. But on reflection, 
the precautionary principle, or "approach," is addressed to situations in which there is scientific 
uncertainty about environmental harm.44 Little scientific uncertainty can be discerned about 
the harm pollution would cause to an aquifer. The Commission's commentary states that a 
precautionary approach is required in view of"the fragility and scientific uncertainty of aqui-
fers."45 Aquifers are no doubt fragile, in the sense that care must be exercised with respect to 
their use and protection. T here may also be "scientific uncertainty" about the precise nature, 
characteristics, and extent of a given aquifer. But, again, hardly anyone appears to doubt that 
aquifers are "vulnerab[le] to pollution," in the words of Article I2. It therefore seems more 
appropriate for Article 12 to have enjoined states to exercise a high degree of caution, perhaps 
even to take precautionary measures, so as to prevent pollution of shared aquifers, rather than 
to have invoked a principle or approach46 designed to deal with uncertainty. 
42 Art. II (2), id. at 24. 
43 Art. 12, id. 
44 Perhaps the most broadly accepted general formulation of rhe precautionary "approach" is that of Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: "In order to protect rhe environment, the precau-
tionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientificcerrainry shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 
3 1 ILM 874, 879 (1992). 
45 Commentary on Art. 12, para. 5 , 2008 ILC Report, mpra note I , at 59. 
46 The ILC's commentary acknowledges rhe controversy as to whether iris a precautionary "approach" or "prin-
ciple" and opts for rhe former on rhe ground that "iris the less disputed formulation." !d. 
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Article 13 deals with monitoring, a critical subject in the case of groundwater. The article 
provides that states sharing aquifers are to monitor them jointly wherever possible, or at least 
to exchange data obtained through the monitoring process.47 States sharing aquifers "should" 
identify the parameters to be monitored, which should include "the condition of the aquifer 
or aquifer system ... and also ... [their] utilization."48 
Article 14 requires "aquifer states" to "establish and implement plans for the proper man-
agement of their transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems."49 It does not state expressly 
whether this is to be done jointly or severally, but its second sentence suggests that the latter 
is intended: "[Aquifer states] shall, at the request of any of them, enter into consultations con-
cerning the management of a trans boundary aquifer .... "50 Since trans boundary groundwater 
is a shared resource, attempting to manage it unilaterally would be an exercise in futility, or 
worse: the consequences could easily amount to a tragedy of the commons. 51 Management 
plans must therefore be prepared and implemented not only domestically, but also jointly, with 
other aquifer states. 52 The article's final sentence provides that "[a] joint management mech-
anism shall be established, wherever appropriate. "53 As already noted, this is one of three places 
in the draft that management is dealt with (the others are Articles 7(2) and 9). 
Article 15, Planned Activities, deals with the same subject as part 3 of the UN Convention, 
Planned Measures, which contains nine articles. (The ILC does not explain why it opted for 
the term "activities" rather than the broader expression "measures," as in the UN Convention.) 
In view of the sensitivity of aquifers, such extensive compression of the Commission's treat-
ment of this important issue is somewhat surprising. The commentary explains that "a mini-
malist approach is taken in this draft article due to the scarcity of State practice with respect 
to aquifers. "54 Since states look to the ILC for guidance, and since its mandate includes not only 
codification, but also progressive development of international law, this explanation is not 
entirely convincing-especially when one recalls that much of the world's groundwater is 
hydrologically connected with surface water. State practice in relation to surface water is there-
fore largely applicable to groundwater, as concluded by the International Law Association in 
47 Art. 13(1), id. at 24. 
48 Art. 13(2), id. at 24 - 25. 
49 Art. 14, id. at 25. 
so !d. 
51 The reference here is to Garrett Hardin's well-known article, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968). Hardin uses the analogy of a pasture open to all herdsmen. The incentive of each is to increase his 
herd without limit, leading eventually to the destruction of the commons: "Ruin is the destination toward which 
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Free-
dom in a commons brings ruin to all. " !d. at 1244. The same phenomenon would operate in the case of a shared 
aquifer. 
52 See in this connection the "Bellagio DraftT reary," a model agreement for transboundarygroundwater, in Rob-
ert D. Hayton & Albert E. Urton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bel/agio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RES. J. 663, 
663 ( 1989) ("Withdrawals from one country can drain life-giving water from a neighboring country and, as a con-
sequence, be the source of severe and protracted conflict .... The draft provides mechanisms for the international 
aquifers in critical areas to be managed by mutual agreement rather than continuing to be subjected to unilateral 
taking."). Article Vlll of the Bellagio Draft Treacy deals with comprehensive management plans, which are to be 
prepared by a joint commission, provided for in Article III and established by the states sharing the aquifer in ques-
tion. !d. at 684, 695. Remarkably, the ILC's draft refers to the Bellagio Draft Treacy, a widely respected model for 
the management of shared groundwater, only for its definition of "aquifer." Commentary on Art. 2, 2008 ILC 
Report, supra note 1, at 34 n.23. 
53 Art. 14, 2008 lLC Report, supra note l, at 25. 
54 Commentary on Art. 15, para. 1, id. at 66. 
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its Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters. 55 Article 15 begins with a paragraph that does 
not have a counterpart in the UN Convention but that would have been a welcome addition. 
It provides that, "as far as practicable," a state (whether or not it is an aquifer stare56) is to assess 
the possible effects of an activity planned within irs territory when it "has reasonable grounds 
for believing" that the activity may affect a rransboundary aquifer in a way that could have "a 
significant adverse effect upon another Srare."57 The two succeeding paragraphs of Article 15 
are based upon Articles 12 and 17(1), respectively, of the UN Convention. They require prior 
notification of planned activities entailing potential adverse effects (paragraph 2) and con-
sultations if the stares concerned disagree about the possible effect of the planned measures 
(paragraph 3). 58 
Part 4 contains the final four articles of the draft. Article 16, a rather ambitious, though well-
intentioned provision, purportedly requires all states59 (not merely aquifer states) to promote 
cooperation with developing countries with regard to the technical and legal aspects of the 
management and protection of transboundary aquifers. Like Article 15, this article thus seems 
to presume that any international agreement based on rhe draft articles would include not only 
states sharing transboundary aquifers but also others, and that at least some of those other states 
would be in a position to "promote" the kinds of"cooperation" envisaged in the article. 
Article 17, Emergency Situations, tracks Article 28 of the UN Convention, 60 and requires 
a state where an emergency originates to notify potentially affected states and competent inter-
national organizations and to take all practicable measures to prevent, mitigate, and eliminate 
any harmful effects of the emergency.61 In an innovation the article provides that a state "may 
rake measures that are strictly necessary to meet" a threat to "viral human needs" posed by 
the emergency, "notwithstanding draft articles 4 and 6."62 Here the Commission evidently 
had in mind crises such as that occasioned by "the devastating tsunami disaster along the coast 
of the Indian Ocean," which" could flood seawater into an aquifer."63 Curiously, however, the 
commentary states that "[i]n the case of aquifers, emergencies might not be as numerous 
55 The Seoul Rules on lnternadonal Groundwaters adopted by rhe Imernadonal Law Association (llA) in 1986 
make the IlA's 1966 Helsinki Rules applicable ro groundwater. Rules on Imernational Groundwaters, in 62 IlA, 
CONFERENCE REPORT 25 1 (1986) [hereinafter Seoul Rules on Imernational Groundwarers]. The rules were 
adopted by the Resolurion on International Water Resources Law, id at 21. 
56 Commentary on Art. 15, para. I, 2008 lLC Report, supra note 1, at 66. 
57 Art. 15(1), id. at 25. 
58 Paragraph 3 of Article 15 also states, in its fina l sentence, that the states concerned "may utilize an independem 
fact-finding body to make an impartial assessment of the effect of the planned activities." Art. 15(3), id. What this 
provision adds is unclear, since states are always free to have recourse to such third parries. The ILC refers in its 
commentary on rhis article to the compulsory fact- finding procedure set forth in Article 33 of the UN Convention, 
but states that "there exists no evidence as yet for such an obligation in relation ro groundwaters." Commemary on 
Art. 15, para. 6, id. at 68. As indicated in rhe text at notes 54-55 supra, this explanation is not convincing. 
59 Article 16 begins: "States shall ... promote ... cooperation with developing States .... " Art. 16, chapeau, 
id at 25. The commemary does not address what is imended by rhe initial reference to "States," but on the basis 
of other uses of the term, unmodified by the adjective "aquifer," in the draft, see, e.g., Art. 15, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that it refers to all states. 
60 See Commentary on Art. 17, para. 1, 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that the UN Convention 
"contains a similar provision in article 28"). 
6
' Art. 17(2), id. at 26. 
62 Art. 17(3), id. Articles 4 and 6 set form the obligations of equitable urilization and prevention of significant 
harm, respectively. 
63 Commentary on Art. 17, para. I, id at 73. 
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and destructive as in the case of watercourses."64 Putting aside the continued confusion in 
terminology65 and unrealistic compartmentalization of surface water and groundwater,66 a 
disaster affecting an aquifer could seemingly be far more destructive than one principally 
affecting surface water, since an aquifer would take considerably more time to cleanse itself 
than, for example, a surface stream. 
Article 18, Protection in Time of Armed Conflict, is the counterpart to Article 29 of the UN 
Convention. The text of the two provisions is identical, save for the replacement of "inter-
national watercourses" with "trans boundary aquifers or aquifer systems."67 Both state that the 
relevant freshwater resources enjoy the protection accorded by international law "in inter-
national and non-international armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of those prin-
ciples and rules. "68 
The final provision of the draft, Article 19, on data and information vital to national defense 
or security, is based on Article 31 of the UN Convention. Again, the substantive text of the two 
provisions is identical. In the case of Article 19, however, the expression "watercourse state" in 
the UN Convention is replaced with "state," purporting to make the article applicable to other 
states as well as to aquifer states. 69 While the commentary offers no explanation for this expan-
sion of coverage, the Commission presumably had in mind the same considerations as regards 
various other articles in the draft that also refer to a "state" or "states" without modification.70 
Article 19 provides that stares are nor required to furnish data and information vital to their 
national defense or security but that they should provide "as much information as possible 
under the circumstances."71 
III. EVALUATION 
In general, the transboundary aquifers draft seeks to apply the principles of the UN Con-
vention, mutatis mutandis, to transboundary groundwater. Indeed, as has been seen , most of 
the substantive articles in the aquifers draft are based on the watercourses articles. 72 Those that 
are not for the most part consist of refinements relating to the special characteristics of ground-
water.73 This provenance validates the ILC' s recommendation in its 1994 Resolution on Con-
fined Transboundary Groundwater that in regulating transboundary groundwater, states 
64 !d. 
65 For the definit ion of"warercourse" in Article 2(a) of the UN Convention, see supra note 10. 
66 As indicated above, most surface water has associated groundwater. It does nor accord with hydrologic reality 
to treat the two as enrirely separate. Su WINTER ET AL., supra note 9. 
67 2008 ILC Report, supra note I , at 27. 
6B JJ. 
69 !d. 
70 SuAns. 6, I l, 15, 16, 17. 
7 1 2008 ILC Report, supra note I, at 27. 
72 The substantive provisions (i.e., those not involving scope and definitions) in rhe transboundary aquifers draft 
that do nor have counterparts in the UN Convention are Article 3, Sovereignty of Aquifer Stares; Article 11 , 
Recharge and Discharge Zones; Article 13, Monitoring; and Article 16, T echnical Cooperation with Developing 
Stares. 
73 The statement rhar provisions of the aquifers draft rhar are nor based on rhe UN Convention "for rhe most 
parr" deal with the special characteristics of aquifers refers to rhe fact that Article 16, Technical Cooperation with 
Developing Stares, is more broadly applicable. Article 3, wh ile inimical to the law of shared freshwater resources as 
discussed below, was apparently inspired by the characteristics of aquifers. 
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should be guided, where appropriate, by the principles in the draft articles on non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses?4 But it also raises two broad questions: first, whether the 
aquifers draft has added anything new; and second, whether it has made a positive contribution 
to the development of the law of shared freshwater resources. 
The first question must surely be answered in the affirmative, if only in a somewhat limited 
sense. The special rapporteur was able to arrange briefings for the Commission by groundwater 
experts from UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Economic Commission 
for Europe, and the International Association ofHydrogeologists.75 These briefings resulted 
in imparting a knowledge of aquifers, groundwater, and hydrogeology in general into the draft 
articles, giving them a scientifically sound basis. This achievement should not be underesti-
mated since groundwater, while much more plentiful than surface water/6 is far less under-
stood by states and their political subdivisions. Injecting the language of hydrogeology into the 
discourse ofinternational watercourse law is surely a good thing and has the potential to inform 
future agreements and arrangements between states concerning shared groundwater. 
The second question, however, cannot be answered so unequivocally-perhaps in part 
because the Commission became so enamored of the science of aquifers that it lost sight of its 
main task: the codification and progressive development of the law of transboundary ground-
water. In the context of the ILC's work, the difference between the terms "aquifers" and 
"groundwater," while it may seem subtle, is important. An aquifer is a geologic formation that 
contains water. The formation itself does not move; it is static. But the water-ground-
water-it holds does move. It responds to a variety of forces, from gravity to withdrawals by 
the state in which it is located or a neighboring state. In short, it is not static. The special rap-
porteur had initially "indicated his intention to deal with confined transboundary ground-
waters" before moving on to other shared natural resources?7 The decision to make the subject 
of the Commission's study, and thus its draft articles, the law of transboundary aquifers, rather 
than the law of transboundary groundwater (or, in the more restrictive terms of the ILC's 1994 
resolution, the law of confined transboundary groundwater), may have been influenced by the 
briefings presented by the United Nations scientific agencies. In any event, the decision had 
major repercussions throughout the draft articles. These repercussions fall chiefly into two 
related categories: the physical and legal scope of the draft and its relationship with the UN 
Convention; and the decision to make the "sovereignty of aquifer states" the guiding principle 
of the draft. These points will be considered in turn. 
The Scope of the Draft and Its Relationship with the UN Convention 
First, the ILC's decision to make transboundary aquifers, rather than groundwater, the sub-
ject of the draft had far-reaching effects on its physical scope and thus on its relationship to the 
74 See note 6 supra and corresponding text. 
75 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 18. 
76 According to the United Nations Environment Programme, of all freshwater on Earrh, only 0.3 percent is con-
tained in lakes and rivers, while 30.8 percent is groundwater. The remaining 68.9 percent takes the form of glaciers 
and permanenr snow cover. See Vital Water Graphics (2002), available at <http://www.unep.org/dewa/ 
assessmems/ecosystems/water/vitalwater/0 l.htm>. In its commentary on the preamble to the draft, the ILC states 
that "[n]inery-seven per cent of readily available freshwater is stored underground." 2008 ILC Report, supra note 
I, at 31, para. 2. 
77 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 13, para. 34. 
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UN Convention. The draft defines "aquifer" as "a permeable water-bearing geological forma-
tion underlain by a less permeable layer and the water contained in the saturated zone of the 
formation. "78 By focusing primarily on the geologic formation, and only secondarily referring 
to the "water contained in" it, the draft invites confusion as to whether the geological formation 
(rock7 9 ) or its content (water) is the primary subject of legal regulation. Unfortunately, the 
draft articles make clear that their overriding concern is with the rock, not the water. This 
emphasis is manifested all too plainly in the first general principle announced in the draft, "sov-
ereignty of aquifer states," which seems to have become its leitmotif. The question whether a 
state enjoys anything but a limited form of sovereignty over shared groundwater bears upon 
the second category of repercussions, discussed below. Rather than focusing on the geologic 
formation, the draft articles could usefully have followed the approach of the International Law 
Association's 1986 Seoul Rules on International Ground waters, which regulate "the waters of 
international aquifers."80 
But even this definition of the draft's physical scope would be too broad if overlap with the 
UN Convention was to be avoided. The Convention, as indicated earlier, covers all ground-
water that is hydrologically related to surface water. 8 1 The only form of groundwater not cov-
ered by the 1997 UN Convention is that which does not interact with surface water, that is, 
water contained in what are sometimes referred to as "confined aquifers."82 As understood by 
the Commission when it adopted its draft articles on international watercourses and the 
accompanying Resolution on Confined T ransboundary Groundwater in 1994, confined aqui-
fers do not receive significant recharge from surface water or otherwise (often because they are 
very deep) and do not discharge water to the surface or to other aquifers. Some regions of the 
world, principally the Middle East and N orthAfrica, refer to this form of groundwater as "fossil 
water." 
What the Commission envisaged in 1994 was that additional work could be done "to elab-
orate rules pertaining to confined transboundary groundwater, "83 as this form of groundwater 
not only was not covered by the ILC' s draft articles on international watercourses (or, conse-
quently, the UN Convention) but also had not been considered by the Commission in its work 
on that project. Yet the scope of the transboundary aquifers draft is by no means limited to 
confined groundwater or aquifers. It purports to cover the water contained in all trans boundary 
aquifers or aquifer systems, including those that are recharged from surface waters and dis-
charge into those waters84- precisely the forms of groundwater covered by the UN Conven-
tion. T he two instruments therefore overlap with respect to all forms of groundwater except 
7 8 Arr. 2(a), id. at 20. 
79 The term "rock" is used for simplicity. As no ted in the commentary, "[a) 'geological fo rmation ' consists of 
naturally occurring materials such as rock, gravel and sand." Commentary on Art. 2(a), para. 1, id. at 35. 
80 Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters, supra note 55, Art. I , at 25 1 (entitled T he Waters oflmernational 
Aquifers) (emphasis added). 
8 1 See the UN Convention's definition of "watercourse," supra note 10. 
82 See, e.g., Commemary on Art. 2, para. 1, 2008 ILC Report, supra note l , at 35: "Aj[ the aquifers are underlain 
by less permeable layers which serve, as it were, as the bottom of [a) container. Some aquifers are also upper-lain 
by less permeable layers. The waters stored in such aquifers are referred to as confined ground waters as they are pres-
surized by more than atmospheric pressure." 
83 Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater, supra note 6, pmbl. 
84 See the definitions of "recharging aquifer," "recharge zone," and "discharge zone" in Article 2(f), (g), and (h), 
2008 ILC Report, supra note l, at 20 -21. 
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confined transboundary groundwater, a point noted by some members of the Commission. 85 
This overlap is problematic for at least three reasons: first, it is likely to lead to confusion as to 
which instrument should apply to a situation that they both cover; second, the rules applicable 
to situations the two instruments cover are not perfectly congruent, as noted above; and third, 
and most fundamentally, the transboundary aquifers draft's use of"sovereignty" over trans-
boundary aquifers as a guiding principle is entirely inconsistent with the UN Convention, as 
discussed below. 
The problems created by overlap might at least have been ameliorated if the Commission 
had decided that the ultimate form of the transboundary aquifers draft would be a guide to 
practice that would assist states in their relations concerning transboundary groundwater. 
Precedent for such an approach can be found in the Commission's proposed outcome of its 
draft articles on reservations to treaties, 86 and the General Assembly could still decide that the 
aquifers draft should be used in this way. But, evidently reflecting uncertainty as to how the 
transboundary aquifers draft would mesh with the UN Convention, 87 the Commission, in its 
recommendation to the General Assembly on the final form of the draft, suggested neither this 
result nor the more usual form, a convention. Instead, the ILC proposed what it referred to as 
a "two-step approach,"88 recommending to the General Assembly: 
(a) To take note of the draft articles on the law of trans boundary aquifers in a resolution, 
and to annex these articles to the resolution; 
(b) To recommend to States concerned to make appropriate bilateral or regional 
arrangements for the proper management of their transboundary aquifers on the basis of 
the principles enunciated in these articles; 
(c) To also consider, at a later stage, and in view of the importance of the topic, the elab-
oration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles.89 
Presumably, the "two steps" are, first, recommendations (a) and (b), and, second, recommen-
dation (c). Whether or not the last recommendation is taken up by the General Assembly, even 
"at a later stage," should depend in part on whether the aquifers draft can be made consistent 
with the law of international watercourses generally, as reflected in the UN Convention, and 
with the scope of the Convention. 
It is worth noting in this connection that the ILC's Drafting Committee decided not to 
include the draft Article 20, Relation to Other Conventions and International Agreements, 90 
which had been proposed by the special rapporteur. That article reads as follows: 
1. The present draft articles shall not alter the rights and obligations of the States parties 
which arise from other conventions and international agreements compatible with the 
8 5 !d. at 17, para. 43 (describing consideration of special rapporteur's proposed Article 20, discussed in text at 
notes 90-92 infra). 
86 See, e.g., id. at 136, para. 68. 
87 !d. at 15, para. 39 (" [I]ssues concerning the relationship with other insrrumems were linked to questions con-
cerning final form. "). 
88 !d. 
89 !d. at 18, para. 49. In December 2008, the General Assembly decided to consider the form the draft articles 
might rake during its sixty-sixth session in 2011. See note 138 infra. 
90 Why the Commission felt it necessary to refer ro both "conventions" and "international agreements," since 
rhe latter is an all-embracing term for treaties, however named, is not known. See the definition of" treaty" in Article 
2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
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present draft articles and which do nor affect the enjoyment by other States parties of their 
rights or the performance of their obligations under the present draft articles. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, when the States parties to the 
present draft articles are parties also to the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational 
Uses oflnternational Watercourses, the provisions of the latter concerning trans boundary 
aquifers or aquifer systems apply only to the extent that they are compatible with those of 
the present draft articles. 9 1 
According to this draft article by the special rapporteur, the trans boundary aquifers draft would 
prevail over any inconsistent instrument, including the UN Convention. This proposal stands 
in sharp contrast to the corresponding provision of the Convention itself, which provides that 
"[i]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall 
affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on 
the date on which it became a party to the present Convention."92 In light of the sweeping 
effect of the special rapporteur's proposed Article 20, its deletion by the Drafting Committee 
is perhaps not surprising. 
A final point relating to the physical scope of the draft is that if it is to overlap with the UN 
Convention, it seems unnecessarily and unhelpfully limited in one respect. An aquifer may be 
situated enti rely in one state but contribute water to a surface stream that flows from that state 
into another state. Such an aquifer is not covered by the terms "transboundary aquifer" and 
"transboundary aquifer system," as defined in the draft; at most, it would be covered by the 
article on "recharge and discharge zones,"93 but the general principles contained in the draft 
evidently do not apply to those zones, as they govern transboundary aquifers and aquifer sys-
tems. Since the principles contained in the draft should logically apply to the waters of aquifers 
or aquifer systems that are located in a single state but contribute to the surface waters of an 
international watercourse, such aquifers should be covered by the draft; why they are not 
remains unclear. Such aquifers are covered by the 1997 UN Convention, but since other forms 
of groundwater covered by the Convention are also covered by the draft, it would not seem that 
avoiding overlap with the Convention is the reason that the current draft excludes this par-
ticular form of groundwater. 
Sovereignty ofAquifer States 
The second category of repercussions of the ILC' s decision to study trans boundary aquifers 
rather than transboundary groundwater relates to the consequent centering of the draft on the 
concept of "sovereignty of aquifer states. "94 Article 3 of the ILC' s aquifers draft provides as 
follows: "Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or 
aquifer system located within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance with 
international law and the present draft articles."95 
91 2008 ILC Reporr, supra note I, at 15 n.l3. 
92 UN Convention, supra note 4, Art. 3(1). 
93 Article 10, Recharge and Discharge Zones, 2008 ILC Report, mpra note I, at 24. 
94 See generally Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty: A Discussion of the /LC Draft Articles 
on the Law ofTransboundary Aquifers, 2 1 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEY. L.J. 191 (2008). 
95 2008 ILC Report, supra note I, at 2 1. 
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The ILC' s commentary on Article 3 cites a number of treaties and nonbinding instruments 
purportedly supporting this provision.96 Only two of those instruments concern freshwater; 
none relates specifically to aquifers or groundwater and none refers to sovereignty over shared 
freshwater of any kind.97 The only way that either of the two freshwater agreements refers to 
sovereignty is by reproducing the general formula of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, which refers to states' "sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources" ("in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of inter-
national law") in the context of emphasizing their "responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states. "98 
Unfortunately, Article 3 does not take Principle 2's additional and important second step of 
underscoring the responsibility of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction that 
affect trans boundary groundwater do not cause damage to other states. T his may be one reason 
some states suggested adding to the second sentence of Article 3 the words "international law 
and" to the version of the article adopted on first reading. 99 That version had only required that 
a state's "sovereignty over ... a transboundary aquifer" be exercised "in accordance with the 
present draft articles." 
If the subject matter being regulated is an immovable part of the territory of states, it is only 
natural to conceive of states as having "sovereignty" over it. Bur if the subject matter is some-
thing that moves from one state to another, from underground to surface, from surface to 
atmosphere, from atmosphere back to surface, and so on in the hydrologic cycle, the notion 
that states have sovereignty over it seems a far from perfect match. Considering the language 
of Article 3 and the commentary on the draft, the Commission seems to have had the first kind 
of subject matter in mind: both refer to a part of an aquifer "located" within a state's territory. 
According to the commentary, "In essence, each aquifer State has sovereignty over the trans-
boundary aquifer or aquifer system to the extent located within its territory." 100 An aquifer-
rock-can be "located" within a state. The term "located," which is used in the sense of 
"situated," 101 does not accurately describe something moving, such as water flowing through 
an aquifer. A substance moving from one state to another is not something that accords with 
96 Commentary on Art. 3, id. at 39 n.24. 
97 This is not the place for an analysis of each of the treaties and nonbinding instruments referred to in note 24 
of the ILC's commentary. Suffice it to say that they relate to a wide variery of subject marrers, from the ozone layer 
and biodiversity to succession of states and the law of the sea. Only rwo of the instruments actually concern fresh-
water, and one of those, rhe 2003 Convention on the Sustainable Development of Lake Tanganyika, reproduces 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra noce 44, in its preamble. Many of rhe 
ocher instruments cited reproduce Principle 2 as well. In providing that "Srares have .. . rhe sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources," 31 ILM at 876 (emphasis added), Principle 2 is not saying rhe same thing as that states have 
"sovereignty over" those resources; nor is there any reference to shared natu ral resources. The orher instrument relat-
ing to freshwater, the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health ro the 1992 ECE Convention on rhe Protection and Use 
ofTransboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, also reproduces Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration in its 
Article 5(c). Not one insrrumenr cited is devoted to transboundary groundwater. 
98 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 44, princ. 2, 31 ILM at 876. 
99 See the comments of Brazil and Israel, in Shared Natural Resources, Comments and Observations by Gov-
ernments on the Draft Articles on the Law ofTransboundary Aquifers, at 22, UN Doc. A/CN.4/595 (Mar. 26, 
2008) [hereinafter Comments and Observations by Governments]. available at < htrp://documenrs.un.org/ 
default.asp>. 
100 Commentary on Art. 3, para. 3, 2008 ILC Report, supra note I , at 40. 
101 
"(H]aving a site, situation, or location: LOCATED." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICfiONARY 
1166 (lith ed. 2003). 
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normal conceptions of what falls under a state's sovereignry: its territory, including its terri-
torial sea. 102 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking of a treary with Canada concerning migratory 
birds, captured the idea well in a case involving the U.S. state of Missouri's claim of exclusive 
authoriry over the birds. 103 Justice Holmes observed that such a claim rested on "the presence 
within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another 
State and in a week a thousand miles away." 104 He declared: "Here a national interest of very 
nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert 
with that of another power. ... But for the treary and the [implementing] statute there soon 
might be no birds for any powers to deal with." 105 Similarly, without cooperation with other 
states sharing transboundary groundwater, an approach afforded little incentive by the idea of 
sovereignry, "there soon might be no [groundwater] for any powers to deal with." With regard 
to water in particular, the first Restatement of Torts captures the idea eloquently: 
Water, like air and light, is a fugitive, wandering thing, flowing over and through land, but 
seldom remaining for any length of time in one place or within the confines of any one 
person's possession. One's dominion over it while it is upon his land is temporary, and 
since it ordinarily flows onto the lands of other persons, it is a thing common to the lands 
of all through whose possession it passes. Unlike air, it is limited in quantiry, and a sub-
stantial use of it by one may prevent others from having it .... [T]he rights and privileges 
of individual users are subject to greater limitation out of regard for the common interests 
of all. 106 
In short, the rights of a state in the groundwater contained in the portion of a transboundary 
aquifer within its territory are unlike those the state enjoys over its land territory. Shared 
groundwater may move slowly, but it does move; it is more akin in this respect to the migratory 
bird or the flowing stream than the geologic formation constituting an aquifer. For that reason, 
states have long recognized that their rights in shared freshwater resources are not appropriately 
described with reference to the concept of sovereignry. 107 Instead, they have accepted that they 
each have rights in the shared resource and obligations with respect to it, and that the deter-
mination of their respective shares of the resource is governed by the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization. 108 
The UN Convention and all drafts on the law of international watercourses prepared by 
scholarly and professional organizations 109 reject as both unhelpful and unsupported by state 
102 The ILC's commentary implies, without being entirely clear, that chis is the meaning of sovereignty it had 
in mind in the draft articles: "The term 'sovereignty' here is a reference to sovereignty over an aquifer located within 
the territory of an aqu ifer State, including the territorial sea ... . "Commentary on Art. 3, para. 4, 2008 ILC Report, 
supra note I, at 40. 
103 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
104 !d. at 434. 
105 !d. at 435. 
106 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, ch. 41, topic 3, Analysis, at 350 (1939). 
107 See, e.g., MCCAFFREY, supra note 27, at 111-70. 
108 See Commentary on draft Art. 5, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation, 1994 ILC Report, 
mpra note 3, at 96; see also MCCAFFREY, supra note 27, at 384-405. 
109 See Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of lnrernarional Rivers, 52 ILA, CONFERENCE REPORT 484 
(I 966); Seoul Rules on International G roundwarers, supra note 55; see also Resolution on the Use ofinternational 
Non-Maritime Waters, Sept. 11 , 1961, (1961)2 ANNUAIRE DE L' INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 381; 
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practice the notion that a state "has sovereignty over the portion of" shared freshwater resources 
located within its territory. According to these authorities, and the ILC's own work on inter-
national watercourses, 110 the doctrine of sovereignty does not apply to shared freshwater 
resources in any way that resembles its application to land territory. The confusion regarding 
the applicability of sovereignty to shared groundwater may have been engendered by the def-
inition of the term "aquifer," as discussed above, and also by the special rapporteur's having 
linked the legal regimes governing transboundary aquifers and shared hydrocarbons. 1 1 1 The 
special rapporteur thus posited a dose relationship between the legal regimes governing trans-
boundary groundwater, on the one hand, and shared hydrocarbon resources, on the other, a 
novel notion 112 whose validity is highly doubtful in view of the entirely separate development 
of the two regimes. 
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, which involved both surface water and ground-
water, 113 neither Hungary nor Slovakia relied on a doctrine of sovereignty over the portion of 
the shared resource located in its territory. In its judgment, the International Court of] ustice 
(ICJ) left no doubt that such a notion does not apply to international watercourses: 
In 1929, the Permanent Court oflnternational Justice, with regard to navigation on the 
River Oder, stated as follows: 
"[the] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal 
right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the 
use[ ] of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of 
any one riparian State in relation to the others". 
Modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-
navigational uses of international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the adoption 
of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of In-
ternational Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly. 114 
The ICJ therefore confirmed that the principle of community of interest applies to non-
navigational uses of international watercourses. As has been seen, the UN Convention defines 
the term "watercourse" to include both surface water and groundwater that interacts with it, 
and the Court was surely aware of that definition. 115 The notion of" sovereignty" over the por-
tion of shared freshwater resources situated in a state's territory is incompatible with the prin-
ciple of community of interest in those resources. The concept of "sovereignty" over shared 
"Berlin Rules on International Water Resources," 71 ILA, CONFERENCE REPORT 336, 343 (2004) (revising and 
updating the Helsinki Rules), available at < http://www.asil.orgfilib/WaterReporc2004.pdf> . 
110 See 1994 ILC Report, mpra note 3, at 89. 
111 See note 17 supra and corresponding text. 
112 The ILC's previous work on shared freshwater resources did nor rely ar all on rhe legal regimes governing 
shared oil and natural gas. See the draft articles and commentaries on the law ofinternational watercourses adopted 
by the Commission in 1994, 1994 ILC Reporc, supra note 3, at 89. The same is true of the work of the Instirut de 
droit international and the International Law Association, supra note 109. 
11 3 The surface water was, of course, the Danube River, on a long stretch of which the project was located. The 
groundwater was rhar associated with the surface water, primarily in the vicinity of the GabC!kovo barrage, bur also 
in wells farther downstream near the banks of the river ("bank-filtered wells"). See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung./Siovk.), 1997 ICJ REP. 7, 35-36, para. 40; 43, para. 56; & 74, para. 127 (Sept. 25). 
114 !d. at 56, para. 85 (quoting Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 
1929 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 23, at 27 (citation omitted)). 
"
5 Beyond the dose relationship berween the ILC and the ICJ, the Court's president at the time, Stephen M. 
Schwebel, was a former special rapporteur for the ILC on international watercourses, and the Court's membership 
included other former members of the Commission. 
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groundwater cannot possibly be squared with "the exclusion of any preferential privilege of 
any one riparian State in relation to the others." In the Oder case, the Permanent Court 
ruled against Poland's contention that the international regime of two tributaries of the 
Oder should extend only up to the Polish border- effectively, an argument that Polish sov-
ereignty over those rivers once they crossed the Polish border made them noninternational. 
The Court based its decision largely on the "community of interest" principle, which the ICJ 
applied to non-navigational uses in the passage quoted above. The ICJ may thus be said to 
have rejected the notion that a state has "sovereignty" over the portion of an international 
watercourse (including groundwater) that is situated in its territory. Rather, other states shar-
ing that resource have an "interest" in it together with the territorial state. The states sharing 
the interest form a "community" whose existence is based on the fact that they share the 
resource. 
Unfortunately, in its commentary on Article 3 the Commission does not clarify what it 
intended to imply by a state's "sovereignty" over the portion of a transboundary aquifer located 
in its territory. The first sentence of that commentary states as follows: 
The need to have an explicit reference in the form of [a] draft article to the sovereignty of 
States over the natural resources within their territories was reaffirmed by many States, par-
ticularly by those aquifer States that are of the opinion that water resources belong to the 
States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those 
States. 1 16 
This characterization of the views of some states supporting Article 3, specifically the clause 
beginning with "particularly," is breathtaking in both its comprehensiveness and its absolute-
ness: the expression "water resources" is not qualified, meaning that it would include all forms 
of shared freshwater resources, not only transboundary groundwater; and these states are said 
to take the view that water resources "belong" to the states where they are located and "are sub-
ject to the exclusive sovereignty of those States." This statement strongly echoes the infamous 
"Harmon Doctrine" of absolute sovereignty over international watercourses, 11 7 which has 
long since been discredited, not least by the state of its origin, the United States. 118 
Nevertheless, one may question whether "many" states actually expressed the view that an 
article on sovereignty over transboundary aquifers was needed. One measure of the strength 
of a state's commitment to a provision of an ILC draft is whether it submits written comments 
on the provision as adopted on first reading in response to the Commission's request. 1 19 By this 
standard there does not seem to have been a great deal of interest in Article 3, or indeed in the 
116 Commencary on Art. 3, para. I , 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 38 - 39. 
11 7 T he "Harmon D occrine" of absolute sovereignty was articulated by Attorney General Judson Harmon of the 
United States in 1895 in a dispute with Mexico over the Rio Grande. 2 1 Op. An'y Gen. 274 ( 1895), available in 
1895 U.S. AG LEXIS 4. The dispute was resolved in the Convention Providing for the Equitable Discribmion of 
the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, U.S.-Mex., May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953. See generally 
MCCAFFREY, supra note 27, at 76-1 10. 
118 The U nited States disavowed the Harmon Doctrine in the context of a later dispute with Canada, stating that 
it never represented international law. Su, e.g., WILLIAM L. GRIFFIN, LEGALASPECfS OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS 
OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS, S. DOC. NO. 85- 11 8, at 59-63 (1958) (reprinting Memorandum of the U.S. 
Dep't of State, Apr. 21, 1958). 
119 See 2006 ILC Report, supra note 16, at 184, para. 73. This practice is followed by the ILC for all of its d rafts, 
as provided for in Articles 16 - 2 1 of its Statute. ILC Statute, as amended, Arts. 16-2 1, UN Doc. A/CN.4/4/Rev.2 
(I 982). Governments are typically given a year to submit their wrinen comments and observations. T he ILC then 
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aquifers draft as a whole, when the ILC adopted the draft articles on first reading in 2006: only 
a small number of states explicitly supported the notion of sovereignty over transboundary 
aquifers and no governments stated that they supported the proposition that "water resources 
belong to the States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of 
those States." 120 Specifically, the Commission reports that only eighteen states submitted com-
ments on the draft articles as adopted on first reading and, of those, only six (Austria, Brazil, 
Cuba, Israel, Portugal, and Turkey) commented on draft Article 3.12 1 Of those six states, three 
(Austria, Brazil, and Turkey) are upstream or predominantly upstream, one (Israel) is upstream 
on one of the four aquifers it shares with the Palestinians, one (Portugal) is predominantly 
downstream, and one (Cuba) has no international watercourses. (Historically, to the extent 
that sovereignty over shared freshwater resources has been asserted, upstream states have gen-
erally been the ones to have done so.) Of these states, only Portugal commented that coop-
eration should be emphasized and that the ILC should "reflect upon whether or nor to shift 
towards a more actual and mitigated doctrine of sovereignty." 122 The remaining five offered 
varying degrees of support for Article 3, although two of these insisted that the article be 
amended to provide rhar a state's sovereignty over transboundary aquifers should be exercised 
in accordance with international law. 123 One of these stares explained that it "does not support 
the making of exceptions to accepted customary international law on this issue." 124 All told, 
among the states with international watercourses (including transboundaryaquifers) that com-
mented, four would not seem to qualify as "many." Additional governments may have made 
specific oral comments on Article 3 during the annual discussion of the Commission's reports 
in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly. However, the topical summaries of 
those debates in 2006 and 2007 125 indicate that only "some" delegations addressed Article 3, 
and that they made substantially the same points as were made in the written comments and 
referred to in the Commission's commentary. 126 
Even if the number of states arguing the" need" for a provision on sovereignty over the por-
tion of shared natural resources within their territories had been greater, that alone should not 
have been enough to persuade the Commission to include such a provision in its draft in the 
face of contrary state practice. Traditionally, in carrying out its task of the "progressive devel-
opment of international law and irs codification,"127 the ILC has taken into account all the 
gives the draft articles a second reading taking into consideration the comments that have been submitted. Also avail-
able to the ILC are topical summaries, prepared by the UN Secretariat, of the debates held in the Sixth (Legal) Com-
mince of the General Assembly on the ILC's annual reports. 
120 See text at note 116 supra. 
121 Comments and Observations by Governments, supra note 99, at 21-22. In fairness, only twenty-one states 
submitted comments on the international watercourses articles adopted on first reading. See UN Doc. NCN .4/447 
& Adds. I, 2, 3 (1993). Unfortunately, low response rares to ILC requests for government comments on its drafts 
are nor unusual . But stares with strong interests in a given draft can be expected to submit comments. 
122 Comments and Observations by Governments, supra note 99, ar 22. 
123 !d. (Brazil and Israel) . These countries seem to have feared making the draft articles the sole limitation on a 
stare's exercise of sovereignty. 
124 !d., comment of Israel. 
125 Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in rhe Sixth Committee of the General Assembly During Irs Sixty-
first Session, Prepared by rhe Secretariat, UN Doc. NCN.4/577 (Jan. 19, 2007); Topical Summary of the Dis-
cussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly During Its Sixty-second Session, Prepared by the 
Secretariat, UN Doc. NCN.4/588 (Jan. 24, 2008), available at <http://documents.un.org/defaulr.asp>. 
126 2008 ILC Report, supra nore I , at 38-39. 
127 ILC Statute, supra note 119, Art. 1(1) (defining the "object" of the International Law Commission). 
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forms of sources and evidence of international law, emphasizing state practice. Yet, as seen, in 
this case it was able to identify no state practice supporting the notion of a state's having sov-
ereignty over the portion of transboundary groundwater in its territory. The ILC should have 
recognized that like the infamous and discredited Harmon Doctrine, 128 these comments, by 
apparently bur a few states, in support of the notion of sovereignty over transboundary aquifers 
reflect not state practice bur advocacy of a position they considered supportive of their interests. 
Whether making such an argument concerning trans boundary aquifers could ever be support-
ive of a stare's interest is discussed below. 
In addition to the lack of support in state practice for the notion of sovereignty over shared 
groundwater, three specific dangers relate to the use of the concept of sovereignty in this con-
text. First, it will reinforce the historic tendency of some states to claim absolutesovereigntyover 
the portion in their territories of even transboundary surface waters. As indicated above, such 
claims have long been discredited and are clearly contrary to contemporary international law. 
In this connection the International Court of] us rice in the GabCikovo-Nagymaros case referred 
to a state's "basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an interna-
tional watercourse." 129 Indeed, the Commission's transboundary aquifers draft includes equi-
table and reasonable utilization as a general principle. 130 The indeterminate, yet powerful, 
concept of "sovereignty" is anything but compatible with and supportive of the principle of 
"an equitable and reasonable sharing" to which states have a "basic right." "Sharing" of trans-
boundary freshwater and "sovereignty" over it even seem mutually exclusive. Article 3's dec-
laration that a state has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer in its territory 
risks reopening what had been considered a long-dead debate between adherents of the "abso-
lute territorial sovereignty" theory and those of the "absolute territorial integrity" theory, 131 as 
well as encouraging states to make claims that can only generate disputes. 
Second, the notion of"sovereignty" may give a state the idea that it has absolute discretion 
concerning the water contained in a trans boundary aquifer when in fact and in law it does not. 
It may get this idea notwithstanding the statement in the second sentence of draft Article 3 that 
the state "shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance with international law and the present 
draft articles." The damage has already been done in the first sentence, as it clearly implies that 
sovereignty is the guiding principle and that the remainder of the draft must be interpreted in 
that light. The comments of one state evidence acceptance of this implication by supporting 
the notion of sovereignty of aquifer states because it "emphasiz[es] that sovereignty is the fun-
damental rule on which the entirety of the draft articles is based so that the latter have to be 
interpreted accordingly." 132 Thus, the first sentence of Article 3 lets the genie of sovereignty 
out of the bottle, and the second sentence cannot put it back in. The state is clearly sovereign 
over the water-bearing geologic formation itself, up to the point where the border intersects 
it. 133 It has rights of use in, but nor sovereignty over, the water contained in that formation. 
128 See note 11 7 supra. 
129 GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 11 3, 1997 ICJ REP. at 54, para. 78. 
uo Article 4, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization, 2008 ILC Report, supra note I, at 21. 
13 1 For a discussion of these theories in state practice and the views of publicists concerning them, see 
MCCAFFREY, mpra note 27, at 112-26, and 126-35, respectively. See also text at note 135 infra. 
13 2 Comments and Observations by Governments, mpra note 99, comment of Austria, at 21-22. 
133 This point may not always be simple to determine, just as the precise location of surface boundaries is not 
always obvious. 
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At most, therefore, the state could be said ro have "sovereign rights" in the water contained in 
the aquifer, though how that would differ from the state's having mere "rights" in that water 
is not at all clear. 
Third, the notion that states are sovereign over the portions of shared freshwater re-
sources located in their respective territories raises the classic problem of how the sovereignties 
of the two (or more) states sharing surface water or groundwater are to be reconciled: under 
this provision, all states sharing a given groundwater resource are sovereign over the portion 
of it located in their respective territories. If we then posit that the water in a transboundary 
aquifer flows from state A to state B, A may claim that its freedom to dispose of the water 
while it is in its territory enables it to use the groundwater virtually134 as it wishes because of 
its sovereignty over that water; but state B, which may have begun using the shared ground-
water before state A, could equally claim that B' s sovereign right to receive the water con rained 
in the aquifer over which it-state B-has sovereignty is being violated by A through A's 
use of the shared resource. These claims would be supported, respectively, by the "absolute ter-
ritorial sovereignty" and the "absolute territorial integri ty" theories, 135 which have now been 
overtaken by the development of the customary international law ofinternational watercourses 
as reflected in the UN Convention. It is the irreconcilability of these theories, caused by their 
basis in sovereignty, that led to the development of the doctrine of equitable utilization, as 
enunciated by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. 136 The sharing of freshwater in an 
equitable and reasonable way will nor be promoted by starting from a position of sovereignty 
over it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ILC' s draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers can potentially make an impor-
tant contribution ro the codification and progressive development of the law and offer useful 
assistance ro states sharing groundwater. They reflect a sophisticated understanding of the 
nature of groundwater and aquifers, which is a11 roo rare in the law, whether domestic or inter-
national. But rather than picking up where the 1997 UN Convention left off, the Commis-
sion's draft purports to regulate not only shared freshwater that the UN Convention does not 
cover, but also that which it does cover. This overlap will inevitably sow the seeds of confusion 
and potential conflicts. The draft also introduces a wild card inro the field in the form of irs 
general principle of" sovereignty of aquifer states." These considerations counsel caution on the 
part of the UN General Assembly in determining the fate of the draft articles. The ILC itself 
has proposed that the Assembly adopt a cautious approach by recommending that it "take 
note" of the articles at present and consider only at "a later stage" whether they should serve 
1 J4 State A's freedom to dispose of the shared water would not be complete because of the obligations of equitable 
and reasonable utilization (Art. 4) and prevention of significant harm (An. 6). But those provisions would operate 
only as limitations on the "sovereignty" conferred by Article 3 and in many cases would be more likely w be raised 
by the affected state (here, state B) after the activity producing the effects had begun rather than by the acting state 
(here, state A). 
IJ5 Su MCCAFFREY, supra note 27, at 11 2-35. 
t :l6 Su id. at 384; see also text at note 129 supra (quoting Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 113, 1997 
ICJ REP. at 54). 
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as the basis for negotiating a convention. 137 The Assembly followed this recommendation in 
a resolution adopted in December 2008. 138 If the General Assembly ultimately does decide to 
convene a conference to negotiate such a convention, the integrity of the legal regime thus 
established will crucially depend on eliminating both the overlap between the draft and the UN 
Convention in terms of the physical subject matter they regulate, and the notion of "sover-
eignty" over shared groundwater, which should have no place in any set of rules governing the 
use, protection, and management of shared freshwater resources. 
137 2008 ILC Reporc, sttpra note I, at 18. 
138 The LawofTransboundary Aquifers, GA Res. 63/124, para. 6 (Dec. 11 , 2008) (deciding ro include this item 
in the provisional agenda of the Assembly's sixty-sixth session-i.e., three years hence- "with a view ro examining, 
inter alia, the question of the form that might be given ro the draft arcicles"). 
